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Abstract
We oﬀer a novel explanation for the use of collateral based on the dual function of banks
to provide credit and assess the borrower’s credit risk. There is no moral hazard or adverse
selection on the part of borrowers–the only ineﬃciency is that banks cannot contractually
commit to providing credit as their credit assessment is subjective. Without collateral, a
bank may deny credit even if its credit assessment suggests that the project is marginally
profitable. Collateral improves the bank’s payoﬀs from financing such marginally profitable
projects, thus mitigating the ineﬃciency arising from discretionary credit decisions. Unlike
models of borrower adverse selection, our model suggests that high-quality borrowers post
less collateral than low-quality borrowers, which is consistent with the empirical evidence.
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1 Introduction
As a rule of thumb, bank loans are generally secured by specific collateral while bonds are not.1
As one of the main diﬀerences between bank loans and bonds is the type of lender–a single
creditor versus small, dispersed bondholders–it would appear natural to rationalize the use of
collateral by focusing on the lender. Instead, models of collateral have primarily focused on the
borrower by assuming either borrower moral hazard or private information.2 By implication–
and absent any distinction based on lender characteristics–those arguments would then also
imply that bonds should be collateralized, contrary to the facts.
This paper provides a lender-based theory of collateral based on the dual function of banks
to provide credit and assess the borrower’s credit risk.3 We derive our results using the model
of discretionary bank lending developed in Inderst and Müller (2003). In that paper, we show
that the fact that banks have discretion over credit decisions provides a novel argument for
the optimality of debt contracts in borrower-lender relationships. Here, we show that the same
intuition also provides a simple, and we believe intuitive, theory of collateral.
At the outset, the bank and the borrower have common information about the project:
the borrower lays out his business plan, which provides the bank with information about his
business idea, cost and cash flow estimates, and other relevant factors. Building on the notion
that banks have specialized expertise in analyzing credit risk, the subsequent credit analysis
provides the bank with a more accurate estimate of the project’s viability.4 Almost inevitably,
1See, e.g., Brealey and Myers (2003). There are many exceptions to this “rule”: Berger and Udell (1990), for
instance, find that 30% of commercial and industrial loans in the US are unsecured. On the other hand, utility
company bonds and mortgage bonds are often secured by specific assets, as are (by definition) asset-backed bonds.
2See Coco (2000) for a survey of the literature.
3As for bonds, rating agencies also assess (and publicize) the firm’s credit risk. Unlike banks, however, rating
agencies do not buy the firm’s debt. It is for this reason why our argument does not extend to bonds. While
our model is exclusively about bank loans, we provide a brief discussion concerning the distinction between bank
loans and bonds in Section 3.
4 It is unclear to us why, e.g., a young entrepreneur should necessarily have better information about the
profitability of his project idea than an experienced lender. Banks’ expertise in evaluating projects derives from
having granted similar loans in the past (Boot and Thakor (2000), Manove, Padilla, and Pagano (2001)) and
the use of credit risk models building on internal (i.e., proprietary) data. Accordingly, Manove et. al argue:
“As a result, banks are likely to be more knowledgeable about some aspects of project quality than many of the
entrepreneurs they lend to ... This is why banks are, and should be, in the project-evaluation business.”
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the bank’s assessment will be subjective: “[T]he credit decision is left to the local or branch
lending oﬃcer or relationship manager. Implicitly, this person’s expertise, subjective judgement,
and his weighting of certain key factors are the most important determinants in the decision to
grant credit” (Saunders and Allen (2002)).
We assume that the bank’s judgement and beliefs can be represented by a continuous signal.
Since the bank’s assessement is subjective, this signal is private information, implying that the
decision to grant credit is fully discretionary.5 In our model, the bank’s optimal decision rule
takes a simple form: approve the loan if and only if the signal is above a certain threshold. The
problem is that this threshold is too high relative to a first-best world in which the signal is
contractible.6 In other words, there exists a range of signals where credit is denied even though
it should have been granted under the first-best decision rule.
Collateral improves the eﬃciency of the bank’s credit decision: if the project cash flow is
low, the bank receives a repayment in excess of the cash flow. In return, the bank can reduce the
borrower’s repayment at high cash flows. Hence, collateral “flattens” the borrower’s repayment
schedule. This improves eﬃciency: since low cash flows are more likely after low signals, shifting
more of the borrower’s repayment towards low cash flows increases the bank’s expected payoﬀ
at low signals. Consequently, the bank is more likely to grant credit at low signals, thus lowering
its privately optimal acceptance threshold and moving it closer to the first best. As a result, the
use of collateral raises the likelihood that credit will be granted.
This argument suggests that we can safely focus on the bank’s expected payoﬀ at marginal
signals, i.e., signals where the bank’s privately optimal decision deviates from the first best. The
fact that shifting repayments towards low cash flows (and hence low signals) simultaneously
reduces the bank’s expected payoﬀ at high signals is inconsequential. This is because the bank’s
optimal decision rule is a cutoﬀ rule: if the bank finances the project at a certain signal, it is
also willing to finance the project at all higher signals.
5Precisely, our model is one of lender hidden information, in which a lender takes an observable action (grant
or deny credit) after observing a private signal. Due to lack of a sorting variable, there is no point in having the
lender choose from a menu of contracts after he observes the signal.
6The subjective nature of the credit oﬃcer’s judgement is frequently viewed as a major problems in credit
decisions (Saunders and Allen (2002)). In response to this, banks have developed computerized expert systems
such as artificial neural networks and credit scoring. With few exceptions (e.g., credit cards), the practical
importance of such computerized systems remains small, however.
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Our argument that collateral improves the bank’s expected payoﬀ from financing low-signal
projects–thus extending the range of signals at which the bank is willing to provide credit–
diﬀers markedly from existing (i.e., borrower-based) theories of collateral. It is obviously diﬀerent
from theories based on borrower moral hazard (e.g., Chan and Thakor (1987), Kiyotaki and
Moore (1997)). In models of borrower adverse selection, on the other hand, borrowers sort
themselves by pledging diﬀerent amounts of collateral (e.g., Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor
(1987), Stiglitz and Weiss (1986)). In a separating equilibrium, good borrowers pledge more
collateral than bad ones–a result that is at odds with the empirical evidence (e.g., Berger and
Udell (1990, 1995), Booth (1992)). In our model, by contrast, good borrowers (in terms of
ex-ante available information) pledge less collateral than bad ones.7
Taking for granted that credit decisions are discretionary, our model argues that collateral
improves the incentives of lenders to grant credit after evaluating the project’s risk. Rajan and
Winton (1995) also examine the eﬀect of collateral on lender incentives, albeit on the incentives
of lenders to monitor the borrrower after credit has been granted. Precisely, monitoring is
valuable because it allows lenders to seek additional collateral if the firm is in financial distress.
The question is therefore not whether claims should be collateralized ex ante, but whether lenders
will seek to collateralize their claims after financing has already been provided. Manove, Padilla,
and Pagano (2001), on the other hand, argue that collateral and screening are substitutes. In
equilibrium, lenders will either demand collateral or screen borrowers. Our model, by contrast,
focuses on the incentives of banks to grant credit after having evaluated projects, not on the
incentives to evaluate projects as such. To make this point in the simplest possible way, we
assume that the project evaluation is costless.8
The link between collateral and the amount of credit is an important building block in macro-
7Our argument that collateral “flattens” the repayment schedule appears (but is not) related to an argument
in the literature on investment financing under adverse selection (Myers and Majluf (1984), Nachman and Noe
(1994)). There, the optimal repayment scheme minimizes the underpricing of high-type borrowers, thus ensuring
that high types do not break away from the pooling equilibrium. In our model, this is not a concern since loans
terms (and thus the “pricing”) are determined under symmetric information. (See Section 4 on renegotiation,
however.) Rather, “flattening” the repayment schedule allows the lender to commit to financing a larger range of
projects after obtaining interim information about the project’s risk.
8Nothing changes if we introduce a small fixed cost of evaluating the project. For a model in which the
structure of financial claims aﬀects the incentives of investors to collect information see, e.g., Fulghieri and Lukin
(2001).
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economic models studying the propagation and amplification of real and monetary shocks (e.g.,
Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Bernanke and Gertler (1989)).9 Our model oﬀers a microeconomic
foundation of this link which, we believe, has desirable properties relative to (moral hazard)
models typically used in that literature. For instance, our model suggests that amplification and
propagation eﬀects can be large even if investor and creditor protection rights are strong.10 In
fact, they can be perfect as the ineﬃciency in our model is not with the borrower, but with the
lender. All we require is that (i) lenders assess borrowers’ credit risk prior to granting credit–an
assumption that appears to hold in most cases–and (ii) this assessment is subjective, implying
that credit is granted on a discretionary basis. Moreover, microfoundations based on borrower
moral hazard are inherently entrepreneurial in the sense that the repayment schedule is designed
to provide the owner/entrepreneur with incentives. It is not clear whether these arguments eas-
ily extend to firms in which ownership and control are separated, since the ability to design
managerial incentive schemes oﬀers an additional degree of freedom.11 By contrast, it would
seem that our argument also applies to public corporations, as the incentive problem is with the
lender, not the borrower.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. Section 3 has two
parts. The first derives (i) the optimal accept or reject decision given some contract in place,
and (ii) the optimal contract taking into account its eﬀect on the subsequent accept or reject
decision. The second part examines the comparative statics implications of the optimal contract.
In particular, it shows that (i) pledging more collateral increases the likelihood of obtaining
credit, and (ii) high-quality borrowers pledge less collateral than low-quality borrowers, which
is the opposite result of models based on borrower private information. Section 4 considers
renegotiation. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix.
9This literature is surveyed in Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). Introducing a “financial accelerator”
to obtain amplification eﬀects is viewed as necessary given that cyclical movements in investments appear too
large to be explained by market indicators of expected future profitability.
10See La Porta et. al (1998) for a cross-country analysis of investor and creditor protection rights.
11For examples of such arguments, see, e.g., Brander and Poitevin (1992) and Dybvig and Zender (1991), who
show that the agency problems between firms and investors in Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers and Majluf
(1984) can be resolved in non-entrepreneurial firms through the optimal design of managerial incentive schemes.
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2 The Model
To examine the role of collateral, we extend the model of discretionary bank lending developed
in Inderst and Müller (2003). A firm (“the borrower”) has a non-divisible project requiring a
fixed investment outlay k > 0. Financing is provided by a bank (“the lender”). To secure the
loan, the borrower can pledge assets, e.g., business property, machines, or receivables due in the
future.12 The total value of pledgeable assets is w < k. The project cash flow x is verifiable and
random with support X := [x, x], where it is convenient to assume that x = 0, albeit this is not
crucial. The upper limit x can be either finite or infinite.
As laid out in the Introduction, we assume that the borrower and lender initially have com-
mon information. Subsequently, the lender obtains a private signal s reflecting his (subjective)
assessment of the project’s credit risk.13 The signal is drawn from the unit interval S := [0, 1].
The signal distribution F (s) is atomless with density f(s), which is positive everywhere in the
interior of S. Each signal gives rise to a (conditional) distribution of project cash flows Gs(x),
which is atomless with positive density gs(x) > 0 everywhere. Moreover, gs(x) is continuous in
s for all x ∈ X, while Gs(x) is diﬀerentiable in s. The expected project cash flow conditional
on s is denoted by µs :=
R
X xgs(x)dx.
14 Finally, although only the lender knows s, we assume
that the distribution functions F (s) and Gs(x) are common knowledge. The prior (i.e., uncon-
ditional) probability of having a cash flow of x is then
R
S gs(x)f(s)ds, while the expected project
cash flow based on public information is
R
X
R
S xgs(x)f(s)dsdx.
Observing a high signal is good news as it implies a greater likelihood of high cash flows in the
sense of the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP). MLRP is a common assumption in
contracting models and satisfied by many distributions (Milgrom (1981)). Moreover, we assume
that the conditional project NPV is negative for low signals and positive for high signals, which
makes the evaluation of the borrower’s project socially desirable.
Assumption 1. For any pair (s, s0) ∈ S with s0 > s, the ratio gs0(x)/gs(x) is strictly increasing
in x for all x ∈ X. Moreover, it holds that µ0 < k and µ1 > k.
12Since these assets are either needed to undertake the project or become available only at a future date, they
cannot be liquidated to finance the investment. Alternatively, we could assume that k is the amount of funds
needed after taking into account the firm’s liquid funds at the investment stage.
13The model can be extended to include a private as well as a public signal.
14 If x =∞, we assume that µs is finite for all s.
6
The timing is as follows. At τ = 0, the lender oﬀers a contract. Given that cash flows are
verifiable, the contract specifies a repayment t(x) ≤ x out of the project cash flow, an amount
C ≤ w of collateral to be pledged, and a repayment c(x) ≤ C out of the collateralized assets.15
It is convenient to write T (x) := t(x)+c(x). At τ = 1, the lender evaluates the project, observes
the signal s, and then decides whether or not to grant credit. Finally, at τ = 2, the cash flow x
is realized, and the lender receives the contractually specified repayment T (x).
Let us briefly comment on two issues. The first concerns a menu of contracts. The standard
solution in this sort of setting is to have the lender choose from a prespecified menu after
observing s. This solution is of no use here due to lack of a sorting variable.16 In fact, letting
the lender choose from a menu only worsens the eﬃciency of his credit decision (see Proof
of Proposition 4 in the Appendix). Second, there is potentially scope for renegotiation. We
consider this in Section 4, where we show that–since renegotiation takes place under asymmetric
information–the optimal contract will not be renegotiated in equilibrium.
The following assumption is standard (e.g., Innes (1990), DeMarzo and Duﬃe (1999)).
Assumption 2. The repayment scheme T (x) is nondecreasing for all x ∈ X.
We also exclude the possibility that the lender “buys” the project before assessing the credit
risk. Using a standard argument, we assume that upfront payments attract a large pool of
fraudulent borrowers, or “fly-by-night operators”, i.e., borrowers without a real project (e.g.,
Rajan (1992), von Thadden (1995)).17 Assuming that fraudulent borrowers generate a signal
s = 0 with certainty ensures that they play no role other than ruling out upfront payments.
While the lender makes the contract oﬀer, we assume that the borrower must receive at
least V ≥ 0 in expectation at the time of contracting. By gradually increasing V , we can then
trace out the entire frontier of Pareto-optimal contracts. Intuitively, V = 0 corresponds to a
monopolistic credit market where the lender extracts all the surplus. On the other hand, there
exists an upper bound V > 0 at which the borrower’s utility is maximized, which corresponds
to the standard notion of a perfectly competitive credit market.
15To make the problem nontrivial, we assume that varying fractions of C can be liquidated depending on x.
This could either be interpreted as selling oﬀ liquid assets, e.g., receivables, or as liquidating assets worth C and
then handing over a fraction c(x) ≤ C of the proceeds to the lender.
16We exclude stochastic mechanisms by assuming that it is only verifiable whether credit has been granted or
not. By contrast, the probability with which credit has been granted is not verifiable.
17This argument also rules out that the lender pays a penalty to the borrower in case credit is denied.
7
3 Discretionary Credit Decisions and Collateral
3.1 Optimal Contract and Credit Decision
We first characterize the lender’s optimal accept or reject decision after observing the signal
s. Naturally, this decision depends on the repayment scheme in place, T (x). In a second step,
we solve for the optimal repayment scheme, which provides us with solutions for the optimal
amount of collateral C and the optimal repayment out of the collateralized assets c(x).
The first-best decision rule–i.e., the optimal decision rule in a world where the signal s is
contractible–takes a simple form. Assumption 1, in conjunction with the fact that gs(x) is
continuous in s, implies that the conditional expected cash flow µs is continuous and strictly
increasing in s, where µs < k for low values of s and µs > k for high values of s. There
consequently exists a unique interior cutoﬀ signal sFB ∈ (0, 1) given by µsFB = k such that the
NPV is positive if and only if s > sFB. The first-best decision rule is to grant credit if and only
if s ≥ sFB.
Since s is noncontractible, the lender’s credit decision is fully discretionary, however. As a
result, the lender provides credit if and only if his conditional expected payoﬀ
Us(T ) :=
Z
X
T (x)gs(x)dx
equals or exceeds his investment k.18,19 As shown in Inderst and Müller (2003), the lender’s
privately optimal decision rule takes a simple form: provide credit if and only if s ≥ s∗(T ),
where s∗(T ) ∈ (0, 1) is the cutoﬀ signal at which the lender breaks even, i.e., Us∗(T )(T ) = k.20
Working backwards, we can now set up the lender’s contract design problem at τ = 0, which
rationally takes into account the eﬀect of the repayment scheme T (x) on his accept or reject
decision at τ = 1. For convenience, we write s∗(T ) simply as s∗. The optimal repayment scheme
is determined in the usual way by maximizing the utility of one side (here: the lender) subject
to providing the other side with a minimum utility of V . By varying V , we can trace out the
18The lender’s expected payoﬀ depends only on the total repayment T (x), not on how this repayment is
composed of project cash flows t(x) and pledged assets c(x).
19We assume that in case of indiﬀerence, the lender approves the loan.
20Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the lender’s conditional expected payoﬀ Us(T ) is nondereasing in s. Ignoring
cases where the lender approves or rejects the loan for all signals s ∈ S, we have that T (x) > 0 on sets of positive
measure, which implies that Us(T ) must be strictly increasing in s. The rest is obvious.
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entire frontier of Pareto-optimal contracts. The lender maximizes his expected payoﬀZ 1
s∗
[Us (T )− k]f(s)ds (1)
subject to the constraint that the borrower’s expected payoﬀ is at least V ,Z 1
s∗
[µs −Us (T )]f(s)ds ≥ V , (2)
and the constraint that Us∗(T )(T ) = k, which characterizes the lender’s privately optimal decision
rule at τ = 1.
By standard arguments, the borrower’s participation constraint (2) binds in equilibrium,
implying that the lender receives any surplus in excess of V . Since the lender is the residual
claimant to all surplus, he proposes a contract which incentivizes him to make as eﬃcient as
possible a credit decision in τ = 1. If possible, he will thus propose a contract inducing him
to employ the first-best decision rule s∗ = sFB. One situation where this is trivially possible is
V = 0, i.e., if the lender extracts all the surplus. In this case, the lender receives the full cash
flow T (x) = x for all x ∈ X, which provides him with first-best incentives. In all other cases,
however, the contract design is nontrivial. The following proposition shows that the optimal
contract is collateralized debt.
Proposition 1. The optimal contract stipulates a repayment R and an amount of collateral
C ≤ w such that the lender receives T (x) = x+C if x ≤ R−C and T (x) = R if x > R−C.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 also characterizes the optimal repayment out of the collateralized assets c(x).
If x ≤ R−C, the unique optimal repayment out of the collateralized assets is c(x) = C. Hence,
if the project cash flow is low, the lender seizes the entire collateral. On the other hand, if
x > R − C, only the total repayment T (x) = t(x) + c(x) is uniquely determined. If there is
an arbitrarily small cost of liquidating collateral, however, the unique optimal repayment out of
the collateralized assets if x > R−C is c(x) = max {C,R− x} . In this case, a transfer is made
out of the collateralized assets only if x < T (x), which minimizes the set of cash flows at which
collateral is liquidated.21 The optimal solution is depicted in Figure 1. It shows that payments
out of the collateralized assets are made only if the cash flow is low, which accords well with the
intuition that “collateral protects lenders from bad outcomes”.
21 In a previous version of this paper, we formally modelled such a preference for minimizing payments out of
collateralized assets. This provided no any additional insights, however.
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Figure 1: Optimal total repayment T (x), optimal amount of collateralized assets C, and optimal
repayment out of the collateralized assets c(x) given by Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 implies that the intuition in Inderst and Müller (2003) for why debt is optimal
also suggests a simple–and we believe intuitive–theory of collateral that is diﬀerent from
existing theories based on borrower moral hazard or adverse selection. The easiest way to grasp
this intuition is by first considering the case where w = C = 0. Without collateral, it must
necessarily hold that T (x) ≤ x for all x. In the nontrivial case where V > 0, this immediately
implies that T (x) < x for some x on sets of positive measure. Since gs(x) > 0 for all x, this
in turn implies that Us (T ) < µs for all s, i.e., the lender’s expected payoﬀ is strictly less than
the expected project cash flow for all signals. In conjunction with the fact that both µs and
Us (T ) are strictly increasing in s, this finally implies that s∗ > sFB.22 Hence, the lender’s cutoﬀ
signal is too high relative to the first best. Put diﬀerently, at marginal signals s ∈ [sFB, s∗) the
expected project cash flow µs exceeds the investment cost k, while the lender’s expected payoﬀ
Us (T ) falls below it. As a consequence, the lender (ineﬃciently) rejects the project.
If w > 0, pledging collateral mitigates, or even eliminates, this ineﬃciency. By Proposition
22Precisely, at s = sFB it holds that k = µsFB > UsFB (T ) , while at s = s
∗ it holds that k = Us∗ (T ) < µs∗ .
Given that Us (T ) < µs for all s and Us (T ) and µs are both strictly increasing in s, this implies that s∗ > sFB .
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1, the lender receives the entire project cash flow x plus the full collateral C if the project cash
flow is low. Since low cash flows are more likely after low signals, this improves the lender’s
expected payoﬀ Us (T ) at low signals, thereby pushing his cutoﬀ signal s∗ down and narrowing
the gap between s∗ and sFB. In fact, if C is suﬃciently large, it is possible to push s∗ all the
way down to sFB, or equivalently, raise UsFB (T ) up to the point where UsFB (T ) = µsFB = k,
in which case the first best is attained. Of course, whether C is suﬃciently large will depend on
the amount of pledgeable assets w. We shall return to this below.
To comments remain in order. First, since Us (T ) is strictly increasing in s, it also holds that
Us (T ) > k for all higher signals s > s∗. Intuitively, since the lender’s optimal decision rule is
a cutoﬀ rule, we can safely focus on his cutoﬀ signal. If the lender approves the loan at that
signal, he will also approve it at all higher signals s > s∗. Second, to maximize Us (T ) at low
signals the optimal contract must minimize Us (T ) at high signals, subject to the monotonicity
condition in Assumption 2.23 Otherwise, the borrower cannot obtain V in expectation. This is
precisely what the optimal contract in Proposition 1 does.
The above discussion suggests that–as long as the lender’s credit decision is ineﬃcient (i.e.,
s∗ > sFB)–all available assets will be pledged as collateral, i.e., C = w. If w is suﬃciently large
so that UsFB (T ) = µsFB = k is possible, the first best can be attained. At this point, it is
crucial that UsFB (T ) is not increased any further, or else we have the opposite ineﬃciency that
s∗ < sFB. This also implies that–if w is suﬃciently large to attain the first best–there is some
leeway in structuring the optimal contract. Any optimal contract must have collateral, however.
Let us briefly return to the distinction between bank loans and bonds alluded to in the
Introduction. In our model, pledging collateral is useful because the lender’s credit decision is
ineﬃcient. This ineﬃciency is due to the fact that (i) the lender’s signal is private information,
and (ii) the agent observing the signal (i.e., the lender) is also the agent providing the financ-
ing. Evidently, if the signal were public information the first best could be attained trivially.
Alternatively, if the signal was observed by someone with no financial stake in the project, this
person would have no reason to misreport his signal. Again, contracts contingent on the true
signal could be written, and the first best could be trivially attained.
Unlike bank loans, bonds are assessed by independent rating agencies such as Moody’s and
23“Minimizing Us (T ) at high signals” does not mean pushing Us (T ) below k. As we just argued, since Us (T )
is strictly increasing in s, it holds that Us (T ) > k for all signals s > s∗.
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S&P. Given that rating agencies do not buy the firm’s debt, there is prima facie no reason why
they should have an incentive to misreport their information. In fact, their entire reputation is
based on the notion that their information is truthful. In terms of our model, this implies that
the (true) signal s is contractible. But if financial contracts can condition on the true signal,
we obtain the first best. Absent any ineﬃciency, there is then no need for collateral. Hence,
while our theory suggests that bank loans should be collateralized, it does not imply that bonds
should be collateralized.
If separation of information production and financing can yield the first best, a natural ques-
tion is why banks provide these functions jointly. Our paper has little to say about this; we
merely take as given the notion that banks evaluate borrowers prior to making credit decisions.
One commonly found explanation relates to the high fixed cost of a bond issue in combina-
tion with the costs and procedural hurdles of obtaining a credit rating. (Indeed, bond issuers
commonly need two ratings, e.g., one from Moody’s and one from S&P.) As a result, issuing
bonds tends to be less attractive for smaller firms or firms with smaller financing needs. Another
possible explanation (Damodaran (2001)) is that “firms can convey proprietary information to
the lending bank that will help in both evaluating and pricing the loan, without worrying about
the information getting out to its competitors. This is more diﬃcult to do in a corporate bond
issue, where the information provided by the firm will be widely disseminated.”
3.2 Pledgeable Assets, Collateral, and Credit Availability
This section examines the comparative statics implications of the optimal contract in Proposition
1. By our previous discussion, the first best cannot be attained unless w is suﬃciently large.
The resulting ineﬃciency is minimized by maximizing the lender’s expected payoﬀ at low signals,
thus maximizing T (x) at low cash flows x. This immediately implies that C = w, i.e., all assets
are pledged as collateral.
How does a small increase in pledgeable assets, say, from w to w0, aﬀect the availability of
credit? Assuming we are in the region where the first best cannot be attained, a change from w
to w0 induces a corresponding change in collateral from C = w to C 0 = w0. To ensure that the
borrower’s participation constraint (2) remains satisfied, the optimal repayment R stipulated in
Proposition 1 must decrease to, say, R0 < R. The increase in C and corresponding decrease in
R further “flattens” the optimal repayment scheme T (x), thereby allowing the lender to further
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lower his cutoﬀ signal s∗. This holds until the first best is attained. From then on, any further
increase in w has no additional eﬀect on either C or R.
Incidentally, it is not optimal to completely “flatten” the repayment schedule (i.e., to set
T (x) = B for all x.) If the lender were fully insulated from cash-flow risk, he would either always
(if B ≥ k) or never (if B < k) accept the project–irrespective of the signal s. The first-best
decision rule, however, prescribes to accept the project if and only if s ≥ sFB ∈ (0, 1), which
implies the project should be rejected if the signal is low. Hence, even if the amount of pledgeable
assets w is large, the lender must be exposed to some cash-flow variability to induce him to use
his private information eﬃciently.
Proposition 2. An increase in the amount of pledgeable assets w has the following eﬀect on
the required collateral C, the repayment R, and the lender’s cutoﬀ signal s∗ :
i) If V = 0 the optimal contract stipulates C = 0, and the credit decision is first-best eﬃcient,
i.e., s∗ = sFB. A change in w has no eﬀect on either C, R, or s∗.
ii) If V > 0 there exists a critical value wFB such that s∗ > sFB if w < wFB, which implies
the credit decision is ineﬃcient. The optimal contract then requires that all assets be pledged as
collateral, i.e., C = w. An increase in w increases C by the same amount, while R and s∗ both
decrease, thereby making it more likely that credit is provided. On the other hand, if w > wFB
the credit decision is first-best eﬃcient, the optimal contract stipulates C = wFB < w, and any
further increase in w beyond wFB has no eﬀect.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 2 is our key result. Unless V = 0–which corresponds to a credit market in
which the lender extracts all the surplus–pledging assets as collateral improves the lender’s
credit desicion, and thus the availability of credit. If the amount of pledgeable assets w is small,
all assets will be collateralized. The greater the amount of pledgeable assets, the higher is the
likelihood that credit is provided.24 Consequently, pledging collateral and screening borrowers
are all but substitutes. Quite the contrary: collateral is valuable because the lender screens
borrowers before granting credit, because it improves the lender’s post-screening decision. By
contrast, if there was no screening–and the lender had to base his decision solely on public
24This is consistent with the empirical evidence. Numerous studies suggest that the availability of credit–and
thus the ability to make investments–is positively related to the value of firms’ assets (e.g., Fazzari, Hubbard,
and Petersen (1988), Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994)).
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information–pledging assets as collateral would have no value. Finally, if the amount of pledge-
able assets w is suﬃciently large to attain the first best (w = wFB), any further increase in
w has no value, since there is no point in raising the amount of collateralized assets above the
eﬃcient level C = wFB.
Let us finally address the relation between project quality and collateral. Suppose there is
no constraint on the amount of collateral that can be pledged. Under this assumption, theo-
ries based on borrower private information (e.g., Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987))
produce the counterfactual result that in equilibrium high-quality borrowers pledge more col-
lateral than low-quality borrowers to induce separation (see Introduction). In our model, the
opposite holds: high-quality borrowers pledge less collateral than low-quality borrowers, where
“quality” is defined in terms of ex-ante available information. Precisely, a project has a higher
quality if it has a more favorable ex-ante distribution F (s) in the sense of first-order stochastic
dominance (FOSD). This implies, among other things, that high-quality projects have a higher
unconditional expected cash flow
R
X
R
S xgs(x)f(s)dsdx than low-quality projects.
The intuition is straightforward: collateral improves the lender’s expected payoﬀ from financ-
ing marginally profitable projects, i.e., projects with signals close to sFB. High-quality projects
are more likely to generate high signals, which implies they are less likely to be marginally
profitable. Consequently, less collateral is required to ensure an eﬃcient credit decision.
Proposition 3. High-quality borrowers need to pledge less collateral than low-quality borrowers.
Proof. See Appendix.
4 Renegotiation
If V > 0 and w < wFB, Proposition 2 suggests that the lender’s credit decision is ineﬃ-
cient. Precisely, at marginal signals s ∈ [sFB, s∗) the lender rejects the project even though its
(conditional) expected cash flow exceeds the investment cost k. This potentially creates scope
for mutually beneficial renegotiations: rather than being denied credit altogether, the borrower
might want to propose a new contract under which he obtains a smaller surplus but which allows
the lender to break even. This is precisely what would happen if s was commonly observable,
in which case renegotiations would eliminate all ineﬃciencies.
The problem is that the true signal s is not commonly observable. In particular, anticipating
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that the borrower might propose a more favorable contract (from the lender’s point of view),
the lender has a strong incentive to claim that the signal is marginal (i.e., s ∈ [sFB, s∗)) even
if the true signal is high and he was planning to accept the project anyway. But at signals
s ≥ s∗ where the lender would have accepted the project anyway, replacing the old contract is a
pure wealth transfer from the borrower to the lender. As we show below, this implies that the
expected value to the borrower from replacing the optimal contract is negative, implying that
the optimal contract in Propositions 1-2 is renegotiation-proof.
We first prove an auxiliary result. It shows that, if the lender prefers some new contracteT (x) to the optimal contract T (x) at signal s0, he also prefers eT (x) at all higher signals s > s0.
This confirms our above intuition that the prospects of obtaining a more favorable contract after
rejecting the project induces the lender to (strategically) reject the project at high signals.
Lemma 1. Suppose the credit decision is ineﬃcient (i.e., V > 0 and w < wFB) and denote
by T (x) and eT (x) the optimal contract in Propositions 1-2 and some other, arbitrary contract
satisfying Assumption 2, respectively. Either the lender prefers T (x) to eT (x) (or vice versa) for
all signals s ∈ S, or there exists a threshold signal es ∈ (0, 1) such that the lender prefers eT (x)
to T (x) if s > es and T (x) to eT (x) if s < es. At s = es, he is indiﬀerent between T (x) and eT (x).
Proof. See Appendix.
Consider now the renegotiation game. After the lender observes the signal but before a
decision is made, a new contract can be oﬀered. (In fact, as the lender can always reverse his
decision, it is irrelevant whether the decision has been made or not as it contains no signalling
value.) If the lender makes the contract oﬀer, the borrower must agree to it, whereas if the
borrower makes the contract oﬀer, the lender must agree.25 Regardless of who makes the oﬀer,
the following proposition shows that the optimal contract will not be renegotiated:26
Proposition 4. Suppose the credit decision is ineﬃcient (i.e., V > 0 and w < wFB). Regardless
of who makes the contract oﬀer, the optimal contract in Propositions 1-2 will not be renegotiated.
Proof. See Appendix.
25 Introducing menus of contracts at the renegotiation stage would not change our results. Absent a sorting
variable, the lender would simply choose his most preferred contract from the menu. See the Proof of Proposition
4 in the Appendix for a formal proof of this assertion.
26 It is straightforward to extend Proposition 4 to any sequence of moves in the renegotiation game provided
this does not create a sorting device (e.g., costly delay).
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The intuition for Proposition 4 is straightforward. Suppose the lender makes the contract
oﬀer and denote the new contract by eT (x). (The argument if the borrower makes the oﬀer is
analogous.) By optimality, it must hold that Us(eT ) > Us(T ) for at least some s (or else the
lender would not oﬀer eT ). By Lemma 1, this implies that either (i) Us(eT ) ≥ Us(T ) for all s (with
strict inequality for some s), or (ii) there exists a threshold signal es such that Us(eT ) > Us(T )
for all s > es and Us(T ) > Us(eT ) for all s < es.
There are now two cases. In the first case, it holds that s∗(eT ) ≥ s∗(T ), i.e., the new contract
does not lead to a lower cutoﬀ signal. This immediately implies that we are in situation (ii). But
if s∗(eT ) ≥ s∗(T ) it follows directly from the definitions of s∗(eT ) ≥ s∗(T ) and strict monotonicity
of Us(T ) and Us(eT ) that Us∗(T )(eT ) ≤ Us∗(T )(T ), and therefore that es ≥ s∗(T ). Evidently, if the
lender oﬀers to replace T with eT , it must be the case that s ≥ es, which implies the borrower is
strictly worse oﬀ by accepting the new contract. He consequently rejects.
In the second case, we have that s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ), i.e., the new contract does lead to a
lower cutoﬀ signal. We are then either in situation (i) or (ii). In situation (i), it holds that
Us(eT ) ≥ Us(T ) for all s (with strict inequality for some s). In situation (ii), by the definitions of
s∗(eT ) and s∗(T ), it holds that Us(eT ) > Us(T ) for all s ∈ [s∗(eT ), s∗(T )]. But by Lemma 1, this
implies that Us(eT ) > Us(T ) for all s > s∗(T ). Hence–regardless of whether situation (i) or (ii)
applies–the fact that the lender oﬀers eT provides the borrower with absolutely no information
as to whether the true signal is s ∈ [s∗(eT ), s∗(T )] (in which case the borrower would like to
replace T with eT ) or s > s∗(T ) (in which case the borrower would like to leave T in place, as the
project will be accepted anyway and replacing T with eT only transfers wealth to the lender.)
Accordingly, the borrower will agree to replace T with eT if and only ifZ 1
s∗( eT )[µs − Us(eT )]f(s)ds ≥
Z 1
s∗(T )
[µs −Us(T )]f(s)ds = V . (3)
But there cannot exist a contract eT leaving the borrower with (weakly) more than V while
making the lender strictly better oﬀ for all s ≥ s∗(eT ) and equally well oﬀ for all s < s∗(eT ) (in
which case the project is rejected both under eT and T ). If this was the case, T would not be the
solution to the lender’s original maximization problem (1)-(2), contradicting Propositions 1-2.
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5 Conclusion
This paper provides a novel, and we believe intuitive, argument for the use of collateral based
on the notion that collateral mitigates excessive conservativism in banks’ credit decisions. Our
theory is entirely lender-based and does not assume any moral hazard or private information
on the part of the borrower. It is valid irrespective of whether investor and creditor protection
rights are strong or weak, and whether ownership and control (on the part of the borrower) are
separated or not. Moreover, unlike theories based on borrower private information, our theory
does not imply that high-quality borrowers pledge more collateral than low-quality borrowers.
Rather, it implies the opposite, which is in accord with the empirical evidence.
At the heart of our theory is a multitasking problem on the part of the lender. The lender
provides both financing and information about the project’s risk and profitability. The fact that
the lender provides financing prevents him from truthfully revealing his information, while the
fact that the information cannot be contracted upon distorts the lender’s financing decision. If
information production and financing could be separated, the commitment problem examined
in this paper could be overcome–provided the information is revealed truthfully, of course. In
practice, banks do provide both financing and information, however. While there are many pos-
sible reasons, one possible reason is that firms feel more comfortable revealing their proprietary
information to their housebank than to a third party such as, e.g., a rating agency, where the
information (or at least a coarse aggregate thereof, like a credit rating) would become available
to competitors (Damodaran (2001)).
Even if information production and financing cannot be separated, our argument would sug-
gest that eﬃciency can be improved if at least the lender does not bear the full investment cost.
For instance, if the borrower has liquid funds, he could use them to co-finance the investment.
(In the paper, we have assumed that the borrower has no liquid funds.) Likewise, additional
funds might be provided by a third party who free rides on the (informed) lender’s decision.
Our theory would then suggest that the lender generating the information (e.g., the housebank)
should hold the most senior claim as this maximizes his expected payoﬀ at low signals. Extending
our model to multiple lenders appears to be an interesting avenue for future research.
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6 Appendix: Proofs
It is convenient to introduce some additional notation. Denote the lender’s ex ante payoﬀ by
U(T ) :=
R 1
s∗ [Us (T ) − k]f(s)ds, the borrower’s expected payoﬀ for a given signal by Vs(T ) :=
µs − Us(T ), and the borrower’s ex ante payoﬀ by V (T ) :=
R 1
s∗ Vs(T )f(s)ds.
Proof of Proposition 1. The case with V = 0 is trivial. Here, the lender can achieve s∗ = sFB
by setting T (x) = x for allx ∈ X, which corresponds to choosing C = 0 and R = x. Suppose
thus that V > 0. To prove Proposition 1 it would be suﬃcient to show that collateralized debt
is an optimal contract. However, as this is needed for other proofs below, it is convenient to
prove already now that T (x) is uniquely determined if the first-best credit policy can not be
achieved. We prove the following claim.
Observation.
i) It always holds (under an optimal contract) that s∗ ≥ sFB.
ii) It is always optimal to oﬀer a contract where T (x) = min {x+C,R}.
iii) T (x) is uniquely pinned down whenever it holds that s∗ > sFB.
We focus first on Observations ii) and iii). Observation i) will then follow immediately.
We argue to a contradiction. Suppose the lender oﬀers (t, c) where T (x) does not satisfy
the above characteristics. We prove now jointly that the lender is not worse oﬀ by oﬀering a
contract where the repayment schedule satisfies ii) and that she is even strictly better oﬀ to do so
in case s∗ 6= sFB. For the new contract, which satisfies ii), denote the repayment schedule by eT ,
where we choose the level of collateral eC = w and where eR denotes the repayment requirement.
Denote the diﬀerence in repayments z(x) := eT (x)− T (x). We choose eR such thatZ 1
s∗(T )
·Z
X
z(x)gs(x)dx
¸
f(s)ds = 0. (4)
Hence, if we hold the cutoﬀ signal fixed at s∗(T ), the lender’s and borrower’s ex ante payoﬀs
are unchanged if we replace contracts. Note that existence of a unique value eR solving (4) is
immediate by the following observations. First, holding the cutoﬀ signal constant, the lender’s
payoﬀ is continuous and strictly increasing in eR. (Recall that gs(x) is continuous in s for all
x.) Second, the left-hand side of (4) is surely strictly positive at eR = x and strictly negative ateR = 0.
Note also that, by construction of eT and by Assumption 2, there exists a value 0 < ex < x
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such that z(x) ≥ 0 holds for all x < ex and z(x) ≤ 0 holds for all x > ex, where the inequalities
hold strictly for sets of positive measures.
Claim 1. It holds that s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ).
Proof. By (4) and continuity of gs(x) in s there exists some s∗(T ) < es < 1 where RX z(x)ges(x)dx =
0. By Assumption 1 and as es > s∗(T ) it holds that gs∗(T )(x)/ges(x) is strictly decreasing in x.
We can thus rewrite
R
X z(x)gs∗(T )(x)dx asZ
X
z(x)gs∗(T )(x)dx =
Z
x≤ex z(x)ges(x)
gs∗(T )(x)
ges(x) dx+
Z
x>ex z(x)ges(x)
gs∗(T )(x)
ges(x) dx
>
gs∗(T )(ex)
ges(ex)
Z
X
z(x)ges(x)dx = 0.
Since
R
X z(x)gs∗(T )(x)dx > 0 and
R
X T (x)gs∗(T )(x)dx = k by definition of s
∗(T ), we have
that
R
X
eT (x)gs∗(T )(x)dx > k. Then, s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ) follows immediately from the definition of
the cutoﬀ signal and as Us(eT ) is strictly increasing in s. Q.E.D.
The new cutoﬀ s∗(eT ) may now lie below the eﬃcient cutoﬀ. In this case, i.e., if s∗(eT ) < sFB,
we carry out another adjustment to the contract. Holding again the original cutoﬀ signal s∗(T )
fixed in (4), we decrease eC and increase eR until the true cutoﬀ signal satisfies s∗(eT ) = sFB.
Claim 2. If s∗(eT ) < sFB we can adjust the new contract by decreasing eC and increasing eR
such that (4) still holds, while the new cutoﬀ is equal to sFB.
Proof. We can use an argument analogous to that in the proof of Claim 1. Take first some
collateralized debt contract characterized by ( bR, bC), where bR > eR and bC < eC, such that (4)
holds with z(x) := bT (x)− eT (x). From (4)–together with bR > eR and bC < eC–it follows that
there exists a value 0 < ex < x such that z(x) ≥ 0 holds for all x > ex and z(x) ≤ 0 holds for
all x < ex, where the inequalities hold strictly for sets of positive measures. By the argument in
Claim 1 this implies s∗(bT ) > s∗(eT ).
As we decrease bC and adjust bR accordingly to satisfy (4), the definition of s∗ and continuity
of gs(x) imply that s∗(bT ) increases continuously. As s∗(bT ) > sFB holds at bC = 0 this completes
the proof. Q.E.D.
Summing up, we have constructed a contract with the following characteristics: i) eT satisfies
the characterization in the above observation; ii) (4) is satisfied; iii) sFB ≤ s∗(eT ) ≤ s∗(T )
holds in case s∗(T ) ≥ sFB, where s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ) holds strictly in case s∗(T ) > sFB; and iv)
s∗(T ) < s∗(eT ) = sFB holds in case s∗(T ) < sFB. If the new contract was accepted by the
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borrower, the lender would surely be not worse oﬀ and even strictly better oﬀ if s∗(eT ) 6= s∗(t, c).
This follows immediately from (4) and as the lender optimally chooses the cutoﬀ signal. To
prove the Observation, it only remains to show that the borrower is not worse oﬀ under the new
contract.
Claim 3. V (eT ) ≥ V (T ).
Proof. We distinguish between three cases.
Case 1: s∗(T ) = sFB. As this implies s∗(T ) = s∗(eT ) by construction of eT , the assertion is
immediate.
Case 2: s∗(T ) > sFB. In this case, construction of eT implies sFB ≤ s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ). It follows
also from construction of eT that the borrower’s expected payoﬀ would remain unchanged if the
loan was approved if and only if s ≥ s∗(T ). Hence, V (eT ) ≥ V (T ) follows if Vs(eT ) ≥ 0 holds
for all s ∈ [s∗(eT ), s∗(T )]. To see that this is the case, note first that Vs∗( eT )(eT ) ≥ 0 holds from
U
s∗( eT )(eT ) = 0 and sFB ≤ s∗(eT ). It thus remains to show that Vs(eT ) is non-decreasing. To see
that this is the case, note first that the borrower’s net payoﬀ is max{− eC, eR− x} such that
Vs(eT ) = Z xeR− eC [x− ( eR− eC)]gs(x)dx− eC,
which after partial integration transforms to
Vs(eT ) = Z xeR− eC [1−Gs(x)] dx− eC. (5)
Assumption 1 implies that Gs(x) satisfies strict First-Order Stochastic Dominance, i.e., for
all 0 < x < x it holds that Gs(x) is strictly decreasing in s. This proves that Vs(eT ) is (strictly)
increasing in s.
Case 3: s∗(T ) < sFB. In this case, construction of eT implies s∗(eT ) = sFB. It then remains to
show that Vs(eT ) ≤ 0 holds for all s ∈ [s∗(eT ), sFB]. As s∗(eT ) = sFB, implying UsFB(eT ) = 0, it
follows that VsFB(eT ) = 0. It thus remains to show that Vs(eT ) is nondecreasing in s, which holds
by the discussion of Case 2. This completes the proof of Claim 3 and thus also of Proposition
1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. We can again focus on the non-trivial case V > 0. Moreover,
by Proposition 1 we can focus on collateralized debt contracts, characterized by two variables,
(C,R). From the proof of Proposition 1 we also know that it always holds that s∗ ≥ sFB, while
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for s∗ > sFB the lender’s repayment schedule T (x) is uniquely characterized. Finally, from the
arguments in the main text we know that s∗ > sFB holds for w = 0. As we now increase w, the
lender’s program becomes more relaxed, which implies that s∗ must be nonincreasing in w. To
prove Proposition 2, it thus only remains to show that s∗ > sFB implies C = w and that in this
case s∗ strictly decreases in w.
Claim 1. If s∗ > sFB then C = w and s∗ is strictly decreasing in w.
Proof. We show first that s∗ > sFB implies C = w. Suppose this was not the case and that a
contract specifying C < w was optimal. We can now apply the steps of the proof of Proposition
1. Holding s∗ constant, we can choose a new contract characterized by ( eR, eC) where w ≥ eC > C
and payoﬀs remain unchanged if we fix s∗, i.e., (4) holds. As the new contract shifts more
of the lender’s repayment into low cash-flow states, we have from the argument in Claim 1 of
Proposition 1 that s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ). If we only marginally adjust eC and eR, compared to C and R,
we can insure that still s∗(eT ) ≥ sFB. Using next Claim 3 of Proposition 1, we also know that
the borrower’s participation constraint still holds. Finally, by (4) and sFB ≤ s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ) the
lender must be strictly better oﬀ, contradicting the optimality of the original contract.
A similar argument also proves the second part of the claim. Take a value w where s∗ > sFB
still holds as we choose C = w under the optimal contract. If the value of assets increases from
w to ew > w, we can construct a new contract with repayment eT where ew ≥ eC > C while
the total repayment requirement is lower, eR < R. Again, we can choose eC and eR such that
sFB ≤ s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ) and the borrower’s constraint is still satisfied. This completes the proof
of Claim 1 and thus also of Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Take two distributions, F (s) and eF (s), where eF (s) strictly dominates
F (s) in the sense of strict FOSD. By Proposition 2 we have for s∗ > sFB that all assets are
posted as collateral. To prove Proposition 3 we now distinguish between two cases. If s∗ > sFB
holds with F (s), implying C = w , then the result is immediate as eC can certainly not be higher.
For the second case, where s∗ = sFB holds with F (s), we have the following result.
Claim 1. If s∗ = sFB holds with F (s), then we have that eC < C.
Proof. Take the optimal contract (t, c) for F (s), which is characterized by C and R. Note
next that the choice of s∗ = sFB is independent of the ex ante distribution over s. Moreover, as
Vs(T ) is strictly increasing in s, the fact that eF (s) strictly dominates F (s) implies that T is also
feasible under eF (s). As s∗ = sFB holds already under F , optimality then implies that s∗ = sFB
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must also hold under eF . Suppose now that a repayment schedule eT is optimal for eF . We argue
to a contradiction and assume that eC ≥ C holds. To ensure that still s∗ = sFB holds we must
have VsFB (eT ) = VsFB (T ), implying that eR ≤ R. It then follows from the argument of Claim 1
in Proposition 1 that VsFB (eT ) ≥ VsFB (T ) for all s > sFB. As eF dominates F in the sense of
strict FOSD this finally implies that the borrower’s participation constraint is not binding if a
contract with repayment eT is oﬀered for eF . As this is not optimal we obtain a contradiction.
This completes the proof of Claim 1 and thus also of Proposition 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove first the following claim.
Claim 1. Suppose Ubs(eT ) ≥ Ubs(T ) holds for some bs < 1. Then it must hold for all s > bs that
Us(eT ) > Us(T ).
Proof. We argue to a contradiction and suppose that this was not the case for some s > bs where
Us(eT ) ≤ Us(T ). Using continuity of Us(T ) and Us(eT ), this–together with Ubs(eT ) ≥ Ubs(T )–
implies existence of some es satisfying bs < es < s and Ues(eT ) = Ues(T ). We now show that
Ues(eT ) = Ues(T ) and Ubs(eT ) ≥ Ubs(T ) can not hold simultaneously if bs < es. For this we can rely
on arguments from Proposition 1.
First, construction of T (x) and Ues(eT ) = Ues(T ) implies existence of some value 0 < ex < x
such that T (x) ≥ eT (x) holds for all x < ex and T (x) ≤ eT (x) holds for all x > ex, where the
inequalities hold strictly for sets of positive measures. Second, using that gbs(x)/ges(x) is by
Assumption 1 strictly decreasing in x, we have that
Ubs(eT )− Ubs(T ) < gbs(ex)ges(ex)
h
Ues(eT )− Ues(T )i = 0,
which yields a contradiction. Q.E.D.
We can now apply the same argument as in Claim 1 to show that also the converse holds.
That is, if Ubs(eT ) ≤ Ubs(T ) holds for some bs > 0, then Us(eT ) < Us(T ) must hold for all s < bs.
Lemma 1 follows immediately from these two assertions. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. Observe first that s∗ > sFB implies C = w. That is, all assets are
posted as collateral. For the proof we make use of the following auxiliary result.
Claim 1. Take the (commitment) oﬀer from Proposition 1 for the case where s∗ > sFB. Then
the lender would be strictly worse oﬀ by oﬀering in τ = 1 a (non-degenerate) menu, from which
she would be allowed to pick a contract after observing s.
22
Proof. Suppose the lender oﬀers a menu {(ti, ci)}i∈I , where I is an arbitrary index set. As
all contracts in the menu must satisfy Assumption 2, it is immediate that there again exists a
unique cutoﬀ signal s∗. For simplicity we restrict consideration to the case where the lender only
uses pure strategies when picking from the accepted menu. Denote the contract that is chosen
at s∗ by (t∗, c∗), which gives rise to the repayment schedule T ∗.
We are now rather brief as we can build on previous arguments. Suppose we dropped all
contracts from the menu besides (t∗, c∗). Then, by the lender’s (previously) revealed preferences,
the borrower would not be worse oﬀ. If the borrower is strictly better oﬀ, which relaxes the
constraint (2), we can simply adjust (t∗, c∗) and shift more profits to the lender, which reduces
s∗. Note that the borrower is indeed strictly better oﬀ if the lender strictly preferred some other
contracts than (t∗, c∗) from the menu for a set of signals s > s∗ with positive measure. Moreover,
as s∗ > sFB holds by assumption in case a simple contract is oﬀered, we know from Proposition
1 that we can further reduce s∗ in case (t∗, c∗) is not collateralized debt with C = w.
Summing up, we can reduce the cutoﬀ and, thereby, construct a better oﬀer if either (i)
(t∗, c∗) is not collateralized debt with C = w or (ii) the lender strictly prefers other contracts
from the menu for a set of signals s > s∗ with positive measure.
Note now that if the menu is non-degenerate, the lender must indeed prefer (at least weakly)
some other contract (t, c) for some signal s∗ < es < 1. As we have shown that (t∗, c∗) must be
collateralized debt with C = w, this implies from Lemma 1 that she strictly prefers (t, c) to
(t∗, c∗) for all higher signals s > es. Q.E.D.
It is now convenient to consider first the case where the borrower can oﬀer a new contract.
To be more precise, we then have the following game of renegotiations. After the lender observes
the signal, the borrower can oﬀer a new contract. The lender can then either accept or reject
the new oﬀer. Subsequently, she decides whether to approve the borrower.
Consider some alternative oﬀer (et,ec)made by the borrower, which gives rise to the repayment
schedule eT (x). We know from Lemma 1 that, unless the lender prefers one of the contracts for
all signals, there exists a critical signal 0 < es < 1 such that she prefers (et,ec) for higher and (t, c)
for lower signals. We distinguish between two cases. Suppose first that s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ). Here, the
borrower knows that the lender will accept the new oﬀer and approve the loan for s > s∗(eT ) and
reject the loan for s < s∗(eT ). Thus, the borrower’s expected payoﬀ is equal to the payoﬀ that he
would obtain if the lender had originally oﬀered (et,ec). As the lender is strictly better oﬀ for all
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s > es, the borrower’s expected payoﬀ must be strictly smaller than V . Otherwise, the original
contract would not have solved the lender’s program of Proposition 1. Hence, we showed that
for s∗(eT ) < s∗(T ) the borrower would be strictly worse oﬀ by oﬀering the new contract.
Suppose next that s∗(eT ) ≥ s∗(T ). Here, the borrower knows that the lender will accept
the new oﬀer and approve the loan for s > es, reject the new oﬀer and still approve the loan
for [s∗(T ), es), and reject the loan for s < s∗(T ). Thus, his expected payoﬀ is as if the lender
had originally oﬀered the menu containing the contracts (t, c) and (et,ec). As the lender is again
strictly better oﬀ with the menu than with the original contract (t, c) for all s > es, Claim 1
implies that the borrower must realize less than V . Hence, also for s∗(eT ) ≥ s∗(T ) the borrower
is strictly worse of by oﬀering the new contract.
Finally, suppose it is the lender who can oﬀer a new contract after observing s. For brevity
we restrict again consideration to pure strategies. Hence, in a given (candidate) equilibrium the
lender oﬀers at most one new contract for any given signal, while the borrower either accepts
or rejects for sure. Denote by s∗∗ the lowest signal for which the lender oﬀers a new acceptable
contract, which subsequently leads to the approval of the loan. By Lemma 1 we know that
by optimality the lender must then oﬀer for all s ≥ s∗∗ an acceptable contract as well. These
contracts can now diﬀer. We denote the set of these contracts by Ω. We distinguish again
between two cases.
It is again immediate that there is no equilibrium where s∗∗ ≥ s∗(T ). For s∗∗ < s∗(T ) the
borrower knows that for all s ≥ s∗∗ the lender oﬀers a contract in Ω, which the borrower is
supposed to accept. Given s ≥ s∗∗, the borrower’s payoﬀ in the candidate equilibrium is then
equal to that of accepting the menu Ω. If her payoﬀ with the menu was not lower than that
from the original contract, s∗∗ < s∗(T ) would contradict Claim 1. Q.E.D.
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